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Comments

SURVEY:

THE COMMONWEALTH COURT'S
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS

ScoPE

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania will play a significant role in the ecological future of the Commonwealth. The prime
responsibility for safeguarding the environment of the Commonwealth was placed on the court by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Act of 1970.' The ACJA provides the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court with exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from the Department of Environmental Resources 2 which is the governmental
agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of the
Clean Streams Laws and the Air Pollution Control Act. 4 The
court also has original jurisdiction of equitable actions based on
these laws where the Commonwealth is a party to the action. 5
Thus, in its appellate capacity the commonwealth court has heard
appeals based on permit allocation under the Clean Steams Law
and abatement orders under the Air Pollution Control Act. In the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the court has been asked by
the Commonwealth to enjoin polluters of the air and waters.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.1-211.15 (Supp. 1972). Prior to the
enactment of this statute the Common Pleas Court for Dauphin County had
these responsibilities. A complete analysis of this act is contained in
Comment, Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, 75 DIcK. L. REV. 465
(1971) [hereinafter referred to as ACJA].
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 61 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter referred to
as the Department]. See note 25 infra.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-691.901 (Supp. 1972).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964) (Supp. 1972).
5. See notes 37-45 and accompanying text infra.
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This Comment will examine the environmental cases decided
by the commonwealth court since its creation in 1970. The first
section of the Comment will survey cases that have involved the
issue of the court's jurisdiction. Also discussed in this section is
the question of standing to appeal departmental rulings. The second section will involve a review of the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Company' which discussed the
requirements which must be met by the Commonwealth in order
to obtain injunctive relief. The final section of the Comment is an
investigation of cases appealed from the Department's adjudications. The first group of cases covered in this section discusses the
evidentiary topics of burden of proof, hearsay, and the substantial
evidence rule. The last two cases discussed in this section deal
with the question of responsibility for treatment of polluted waters
from abandoned mines.
I.

JURISDICTION AND APPEALS

The ACJA provides that the commonwealth court's original
jurisdiction is exclusive, except where it is concurrent with the
courts of common pleas. 7 The ACJA, however, does not enumerate
areas of concurrent jurisdiction. In Commonwealth v. Queen
Coal," and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth,9 the commonwealth court held that its jurisdiction under the Air Pollution Control Act' 0 and the Clean Streams Law," respectively, is concurrent
with the courts of common pleas. Jurisdiction under Section 10 of
6. 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 555 (1971).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.401 (Supp. 1972):
(a) The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of:
(1) All civil actions or proceedings against the Commonwealth or
any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity....
(b) The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court under this section shall be exclusive except as provided in Section 201 of this
act and except with respect to actions or proceedings by the
Commonwealth or any officer thereof . . . where the jurisdiction
of the court shall be concurrent with the several courts of common pleas.
Section 201 of the Act provides:
The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(1) All cases of habeas corpus;
(2)
All cases of mandamus or prohibition to courts of inferior
jurisdiction;
(3) All cases of quo warranto as to any officer of statewide jurisdiction.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.201 (Supp. 1972).
8. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 28 (1971).
9. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 616, 284 A.2d 85 (1971).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4001-15 (Supp. 1971).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-1001 (Supp. 1972).

the Air Pollution Control Act, however, had been statutorily vested
solely in the courts of common pleas.1 2 The commonwealth court
has resolved this inconsistency by holding Section 10 to be inconsistent with the ACJA and, therefore, repealed. 13 The court in
Commonwealth v. Queen Coal'4 stated:
We refer also to Section 509 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, supra, where it is stated: 'Repealers and savings provisions-(f). All other parts of those acts which
are specified in this section or in section 508 of this Act
and all other acts and parts of acts are hereby repealed insofar as inconsistent with this act.' The legislative intent
is obvious, that although Section 10 of the prior enacted
Air Pollution Control Act gave exclusive jurisdiction to
the various courts of common pleas, Section 401 (b) and the
repealer sections of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act
created and vested concurrent jurisdiction in the two
courts.,5
Thus, in light of the Queen Coal decision, there is no longer any
doubt that under the Clean Streams Law and the Air Pollution
Control Act, the commonwealth court's original jurisdiction of
equitable actions, is concurrent with the courts of common pleas.
There is some dispute regarding which court-commonwealth
of common pleas-will have jurisdiction of cases brought under
"The Natural Resources and The Public Estate" amendment to the
Pennsylvania Constitution.'8 There has been no explanatory legislation to this amendment which clarifies which court has jurisdiction. The Court of Common Pleas of Adams County in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc. 17 has held
that it has concurrent jurisdiction with the commonwealth court
where equitable relief is sought under the new constitutional
amendment.
Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Schedule to the
Judiciary Article) provides that "until otherwise provided by law
the several courts of common pleas shall exercise the jurisdiction
now vested in the present courts of common pleas."' s The jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas, as previously stated, has not
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-10 (1964).
13. Commonwealth v. Queen Coal Co., 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 28
(1971).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 31.
16. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1972):
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the
common property of all people including generations yet to come.
As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve
and maintain them for the benefit of all people.
17. No. 2, Court of Common Pleas, Adams County (July 1971).
18. PA. CONST.art. V, § 4 (1968).
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been specifically provided by law as far as the new amendment to
the constitution is concerned. However, the Adams County Court,
in reaching its decision, relied on an 1857 statute granting equitable
jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas in matters which are
"prejudicial to the interest of the community."' 9 The Adams
County Court reasoned that the right to a clean environment is an
interest of the community and, therefore, the courts of common
20
pleas have concurrent jurisdiction with the commonwealth court.
It is interesting to note that the Commonwealth and Allegheny
County are presently bringing an action under the new amendment
in the Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County against
United States Steel, alleging that the company's bee hive coke
ovens are polluting the air.21 If present practice could be assigned
the status of precedent, it would be settled procedure that jurisdiction in this matter is concurrent. Nothing in the Adams County
Court's reasoning is inconsistent with the ACJA. Furthermore, the
court's holding is consistent with the commonwealth court's philosophy on jurisdiction contained in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Commonwealth22 which states:
Nor would we be prepared to say that the Commonwealth
Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in any action or proceedings brought by the State except where the legislative
intent is clear and unequivocal in denying to the courts of
common pleas their historical and traditional
subject mat23
ter jurisdiction of such classes of actions.
The commonwealth court has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals
from state administrative agencies. 24 This, of course, means that
the court has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals taken from adjudica25
tions of the Department and its predecessor agencies.
The question of standing to appeal a determination by an environmental administrative agency has also come before the court.
19.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 283 (1962).

20. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
No. 2, Court of Common Pleas, Adams County, at 5 (July 1971).
21. Commonwealth v. United States Steel, No. 7, Court of Common
Pleas, Allegheny County (February 9, 1972).
22. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 616, 284 A.2d 85 (1971).
23. Id. at 621, 284 A.2d at 87.
24.
25.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 402 (Supp. 1972).
The Department, created under PA. STAT.

ANN.

tit. 71, § 61

(Supp. 1972), replaced the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-1(2) (Supp. 1970), the Department of Forests
and Waters, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-1(1) (Supp. 1970), the Air Pollution Commission, and the Sanitary Water Board, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 510-1 (6-21) (Supp. 1970).

In Committee to Preserve Mill Creek v. Secretary of Health,28 a
group of citizens appealed a decision by the Secretary of Health
which granted a permit to a swim club to discharge water into Mill
Creek. The Administrative Agency Law states that "any person
aggrieved [by an agency adjudication] who has a direct interest in
such adjudication shall have the right to appeal. ' 27 The Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act,2" the relevant law in the Mill Creek
case, provides that "any person" may appeal and states nothing
about a direct interest requirement. 29 The commonwealth court
held that there is no "meaningful distinction" between the Administrative Agency Law and the Sewage Facilities Act; both require
a "direct interest. ' 30 The "direct interest" requirement does not restrict the class of possible appellants to disappointed permit applicants, 3 but permits any aggrieved citizen with a direct interest in
the outcome of the adjudication to appeal. Although the court
found that persons residing adjacent to and down stream from the
proposed pool were persons aggrieved, it denied the standing of the
committee, stating:
The Committee to Preserve Mill Creek is on an entirely different footing. It is not the owner of any land
near the site and it is not the authorized agent of any such
owner and cannot, therefore, in the legal sense be aggrieved by the grant of the32permit or have a direct interest
in the denial of the appeal.
Since the provisions dealing with the right to appeal in the Air
Pollution Control Act

33

and the Clean Streams Law 34 are worded

in the same language as the Sewage Facilities Act,33 it can be assumed that in the area of air pollution and water pollution, a concerned citizens' group will not have standing to appeal unless it
owns property, separate from that of its members, which is directly
affected by the Department's adjudications.3
26. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 200, 281 A.2d 468 (1971).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710,41 (1962).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 750.12(a) (1964).
29. Id.
30. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 200, 206, 281 A.2d 468, 471 (1971).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 207, 281 A.2d at 472.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4005d(5) (Supp. 1972).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.7 (Supp. 1972) provides:
a. Any person or municipality who shall be aggrieved by any
action of the department under this act shall have the right to
appeal such action to the board.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 750.12(a) (1964).
36. See Sierra Club v. Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
110, 281 A.2d 256 (1971) (the issue of standing was not raised and the
Sierra Club was allowed to appeal the agency's determination).
Two dismetrically opposed cases exist on the issue of standing under
Federal Administrative Law. Citizens' Committee for the Hudson Valley
v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), and Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 907 (1971). See also, Recent Developments Administrative Law and Procedure,16 VILL. L. REv. 729 (1971).
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II.

EQUITABLE RELIEF

Under the Clean Streams Law 37 and the Air Pollution Control
Act, the Commonwealth is authorized to seek injunctive relief
against an alleged polluter. Traditionally there are two criteria
which must be met before a preliminary injunction may be
granted. First, the injury threatened must be of a permanent and
irreparable character. 39 Secondly, the plaintiff's right to relief
40
must be "clear" and "not open to question.
38

These criteria were liberalized by the commonwealth court in
Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Co. 41 Barnes and Tucker
operated a coal mine in the vicinity of the West Branch of the Susquehanna River which was discharging acid mine water through
the earth's surface into the river. The Sanitary Water Board required Barnes and Tucker to install a Duman Dam Treatment Facility as a condition to the issuance of a permit for discharge of
acid mine water. Barnes and Tucker briefly operated the facility
until cessation of its mining activities. The Commonwealth, realizing the harm that was being done to the river, began operating the
facility at its own expense and sought a preliminary injunction directing Barnes and Tucker to operate the treatment facility pending the determination of the case upon its merits.
The problem confronting the commonwealth court was that
as long as the Commonwealth continued to operate the treatment
facility, no irreparable harm would occur, and, thus, no injunction
could be obtained. The court held that the Commonwealth was a
mere volunteer and if the Commonwealth as a volunteer should
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1972).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4011 (Supp. 1972).
39. McDonald v. Noga, 393 Pa. 309, 313, 141 A.2d 842, 844 (1958)
(preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with ingress
and egress from leased property denied). See Commonwealth v. Queen
Coal Co., 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 9 (1971) (preliminary injunction to
enjoin operation of bee hive coke oven denied); and Ward v. Hapden
Township, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 22, 25 (1970) (injunction to enjoin operation of a sewage treatment plant denied).
40. 393 Pa. at 313, 141 A.2d at 844. The Supreme Court in McDonald
stated: "A preliminary injunction is granted only in a clear case where the
ground for it is not open to question." Id. at 313, 141 A.2d at 844. Accord,
Camenisch v. Allen, 351 Pa. 257, 40 A.2d 420 (1945) (injunction sought to
enforce contract not to compete). The supreme court in Camenisch stated:
This case was before the court upon plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and as proofs submitted did not present 'a
clear case where the (plaintiffs') right is unquestionable, a preliminary injunction was refused.'
Id. at 257, 40 A.2d at 420.
41. 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 552 (1971).

cease operation of the treatment facility, irreparable harm would
occur. The court stated:
[We] further conclude, under the circumstances here present that irreparable harm although not presently existing
is so close to reality, that a court in the exercise of its
equitable powers should consider threatened or potential
irreparable
harm as the equivalent of existing irreparable
42
harm.

Thus, the potential irreparable harm caused by pollution in the
future was held to be sufficient grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Barnes and Tucker Co. contended that the Commonwealth's
right to ultimate relief was not clear and, thus, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction should be precluded. The court held that
the right to the preliminary injunction must be clear rather than
the right to the ultimate relief sought. 43 The court in Barnes and
Tucker was willing to loosely interpret the clear right requirement, stating:
A review of many decisions in which there is announced the principle that a plaintiff's right to a preliminary injunction should be clear convinces us that it very
generally affords little guidance for its' application in other
cases, particularly in those cases as in this one where the
public interest is so compelling. It would appear that this
pronouncement is little more than an expression of caution
that courts
should exercise this equitable power with re44
straint.
Thus, the commonwealth court demonstrated its willingness to
grant a preliminary injunction in a pollution case where the plaintiff's right to relief is only questionable. Such a position runs con45
trary to prior Pennsylvania law.

The commonwealth court's decision in Barnes and Tucker
should have far reaching significance in establishing equitable
principles in the field of enivronmental law in Pennsylvania. Most
important is the court's recognition of the "compelling" public interest in the preservation and the improvement of the environment. Furthermore, the court's formulation of the doctrine of potential irreparable harm means that industry will be unable to continue pollution while awaiting for the court to determine the rights
and obligations of the parties if "calamitous results" 46 might ensue
42. Id. at 558.

Accord, Commonwealth v. State of West Virginia,

262 U.S. 553, aff'd on rehearing, 263 U.S. 350 (1923).

The United States

Supreme Court stated:
One does not have to await the consummation of the threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.
Id. at 592.
43. 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 559.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
46. Id. at 558.
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during the wait. The Commonwealth will be allowed to obtain
injunctive relief even in questionable circumstances if the public
interest compels such relief.
III.

REVIEW OF AGENCY DETERMINATIONS

Certain general standards have been developed in Pennsylvania which define a court's scope of review of agency determinations. In the environmental area, agency rulings on permit allocation and the issuance of abatement order against industrial polluters are of prime concern. 47 Generally, a court will affirm an
agency's adjudication when it is "based on competent evidence
and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.1 48 The specific statutory guidelines for review are provided in the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, 49 which states that the court should affirm the agency determination unless:
[It] shall find the same is in violation of the constitutional
rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or
...that any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its
50 adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence.
Abuse of discretion as a criterion for reversal is discussed by Chief
Justice Stern in Blumenschein v. Housing Authority of Pitts51
burgh:
By a host of authorities in our and other jurisdictions
it has been established as an elementary principle of law
that courts will not review the actions of governmental
bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action,
or abuse of power; they will not inquire into the wisdom
of such actions or into details of the matter adopted to
carry them into execution. It is true that the mere possession of discretionary power by an administrative body does
not make it wholly immune from judicial review, but the
47. The Department's procedure in issuing permits and abatement orders is discussed in Comment, Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania,
16 VILL. L. REV. 851 (1971).
48. E.g., Chillisquaque Creek Watershed Ass'n v. Sanitary Water Bd.,
2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 561, 564, 280 A.2d 132 (1971). In this case, the
court affirmed the Board issuance of a permit to discharge industrial wastes,
even though no specific water quality standards were established for the
creek in question. The Board, however, placed 16 conditions in the permit which the court found were sufficient to safeguard the environment.
The court reasoned that because of these safeguards there was no abuse
of discretion.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962).
50.

Id.

51. 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954).

scope of that review is limited to the determination of
whether there has been any manifest and flagrant abuse
of discretion or a purely
arbitrary execution of the agency's
52
duties or functions.
The commonwealth court apparently has not developed any
new standards of review for appeals from the Department's adjudication. The court, however, recognizes that a compelling public interest in a pollution free environment may conflict with an
individual's right to due process of law. In North American Coal
Corporationv. Commonwealth,53 Judge Kramer resolved the problem as follows:
Regardless of the urgency, or importance, or the volume
of the clamor for environmental purity this Court cannot
ignore well defined and long settled principles of law
which protect all of our citizens. If the regulatory agencies are to carry out the full legislative intent of their respective enabling statutes, then they must do so under the
well recognized procedural due process guarantees, rights,
duties and standards provided by law. 4
With these policies in mind, the court has reversed the majority of
appeals from the Department's adjudication.55 The principal reasons for these reversals have been evidentiary or based on statutory interpretation.
A.

Burden of Proof
The Commonwealth, through the Department or its predecessor agencies, is the moving party in an agency adjudication. Accordingly, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the
pollution laws have been violated. 56 When the Department attempts to enforce an abatement order, it must establish its case by
57
a preponderance of the evidence.
52. Id. at 567, 109 A.2d at 334.
53. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356 (1971).
54. Id. at 479-80, 279 A.2d at 362.
55. For cases in which the Department and its predecessors have been
overruled see Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 4 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 407, 286 A.2d 459 (1972) (permit refused to discharge acid mine water
from abandoned mine); Harmar Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 435, 285 A.2d 898 (1972) (permit refused to discharge acid
mine waters from abandoned mines); A.P. Weaver and Sons v. Sanitary
Water Board, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971) (mine
drainage permit revoked for drainage from bituminous coal mines); North
American Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 279
A.2d 356 (1971) (abatement order issued against defendant's bee hive
coke ovens); Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971) (abatement order against bee hive coke ovens).
56. Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
453, 279 A.2d 388, 396 (1971).
57. North American Coal Corp. v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356 (1971):
However, in this case, the Commission is attempting to enforce an
abatement order, after hearing the matter on its merits, based
upon appeal from an adjudication of the Department of Health
under Section 5 of the Act (35 P.S. 4005). We agree with the
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The court, in a case under its original jurisdiction, has implied
that notice of the activity which is proscribed will be an element
of the Commonwealth's burden of proof. In Commonwealth v.
Toro Development Company,8 the court stated:
If it should be determined that Toro had no way of knowing that it was acting in violation of the Act because the
Board did not give sufficient notice or warning, either
through published standards or through individual instructions or through its rules and regulations, then the
Court will have to rule whether or not the plaintiff has
met its burden of proof.
0
In Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth,"
the commonwealth court
held that Section 1.3 of Air Pollution Commission Regulation IV61
provided reasonable notice to the citizens of the Commonwealth of
the minimum air pollution standards6 2 The criteria used by the
court to determine the legal sufficiency of the regulation were
whether it was "reasonably understandable" and "adequately specific. 63 It should be noted, however, that the court has not yet
ruled whether the published standards, rules, and regulations formulated under the Clean Streams Law afford citizens of the Commonwealth sufficient notice. The court may have this issue before
it as far as siltation is concerned in Toro. In Toro, it was alleged
that the defendant accumulated soil on its land and that the soil
ran into Ambers Creek when it rained, rendering the water of the
creek harmful to fish and other aquatic life. Judge Kramer, in
reviewing the preliminary objections raised in Toro, stated that the
issue of notice would have to be determined in an evidentiary hear64
ing.
Although specific standards have been formulated for industrial, 65 sewage6 6 and mine drainage 7 pollution, there are no spe-

Commission when it states that the comparative degree of proof
by which a case must be established before an administrative tribunal is the same as in civil judicial proceedings, i.e., a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not required.
Id. at 473, 279 A.2d at 358-59.
58. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 429 (1971).
59. Id. at 433.
60. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971).
61.

2 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 491 (1970).

62.

Id. at 456, 279 A.2d at 397.

63.

Id.

64. 2 Pa. Commonwealth
been decided on the merits.
65. Sanitary Water Board
66. Sanitary Water Board
67. Sanitary Water Board

Ct. 429, 433 (1971).

This case has not

Regulation, Art. 600, §§ 1-16 (1965).
Regulation, Art. 500, §§ 1-12 (1968).
Regulation, Art. 700, §§ 1-13 (1968).

cific standards on siltation caused by soil, acid, or any other material. It is abhorrent to allow continued pollution of the Commonwealth's water by siltation. It is equally abhorrent for an environmental agency not to carry out its statutory mandate to formulate rules and regulations.6" The Clean Streams Law defines
pollution69 quite broadly and this broad definition could, by an
expert, be said to encompass siltation. It is submitted, however,
that the layman is not given proper notice unless "reasonably understandable" and "adequately specific" rules and regulations are
promulgated.70
The commonwealth court has recognized the difficulty of establishing standards for siltation. In Sierra Club v. Sanitary Water Board,71 the court agreed with the appellee's contention which
stated:
Siltation is not a problem for which standards may be
easily established and enforced. Some silt may be useful
to a stream, but the precise point at which it becomes
harmful is not clear. Nor are many of the common sources
such as plowing of farm fields, adequately controlled.
Nevertheless, it is known that excessive silt in a stream is
definitely injurious to certain types of aquatic life, and
flagrant examples of excessive siltation may be readily
recognized. Consequently, the best way to deal with the
problem, at this point, is to require that meaningful preventive safeguards be incorporated in any plan of an oper72
ation where the potential for excessive siltation exists.
The court, however, did not define the circumstances under which
a "potential for excessive siltation" would exist. It is the Department's duty to formulate a standard which will define the circumstances under which meaningful safeguards must be taken to prevent siltation.
B.

Hearsay

The Department, as any other administrative agency, is not
bound by the technical rules of evidence. 73 However, it is spe68.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-20(b) (Supp. 1972):
(b) The Environmental Quality Board shall have the power and
its duties shall be to formulate, adopt, and promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be determined by the board for the proper
performance of the work of the department, and such rules and
regulations, when made by the board, shall become the rules and
regulations of the department.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.401 (Supp. 1972) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or municipality to put or place
into any of the waters of the Commonwealth, or allow or permit
to be discharged from property owned or occupied by such person
or municipality into any waters of the Commonwealth, any substance of any kind or c.haracter resulting in pollution as herein
defined. Any such discharge is hereby declared to be a nuisance.
70. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
71. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 110, 281A.2d 256 (1971).
72. Id. at 115, 281 A.2d at 259.
73. PA. STAT. ANw€. tit. 71, § 1710.32 (1962).
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cifically established by statute that "reasonable examination and
cross-examination shall be permitted. 7 4 In A.P. Weaver and Sons
v. Sanitary Water Board,75 the commonwealth court held that a
geological survey prepared by one of the Department's geologists
was inadmissible as hearsay, since the expert who prepared the
survey was not present in court. The court stressed that the survey included conclusions and opinions of the writer and, as such,
would not be admissible under the public records exception to the
hearsay rule.78 The weight of Pennsylvania authority supports
77
the court's holding as applied to the facts presented in the case.
The question arises, however, as to whether the report of one of
the Department's expert investigators would be admissible on its
own if its conclusions were based on the results of objective testing; for example, chemical analysis of a water sample. It is submitted that the court would not admit such evidence. In Weaver,
the court cited Commonwealth v. Bonser78 for the broad proposition that "reasonable cross-examination shall be afforded in all administrative hearings. '79 The court accepted the rule stated in
Sanitary Water Board v. Stinard:8 0
The essential facts should be established by legally competent evidence and witnesses should be subject to cross examination. Likewise the reports of field investigators
74. Id.
75. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 110, 281 A.2d 256 (1971).
76. The court quoted from 30 AM. JUR. 2d, EVIDENCE, § 991 (1967) in
support of its holding:
Moreover, it has been held that records which concern causes and
effects, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinions, or drawings of conclusion, are not admissible as
public records.
Cf. Smith v. Mott, 100 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1957) and 30 AM. JuR. 2d EVIDENCE,
§ 1010 (1967):
Where a laboratory test has been made by a public agency under
a duty to perform such tests, the agency's report of results is admissible as competent evidence of the matter or facts therein recited under the public records excepting to the hearsay rule.
77. See Wittbank v. Erie Ass'n of Philadelphia, 293 Pa. 206, 142
A. 208 (1928) (Workmen's Compensation-statement made to wife and
doctor by deceased); McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 104 A.
616 (1918) (Workmen's Compensation-employment agreement testified to
orally); Kozlowski v. Unemployment Comp. Ed., 191 Pa. Super. 83, 155
A.2d 373 (1959) (company inspector's report admitted without inspector's
testimony); Sanitary Water Ed. v. Penn Weis Const. Co., 69 Dauph. 218
(Pa. C.P. 1957) (letter from engineer who did not appear); Sanitary Water
Ed. v. Stinard, 68 Dauph. 26 (Pa. C.P. 1956) (field investigator's report
admitted where investigator did not appear).
78. 46 Pa. D. & C.2d 565 (C.P. Mont. 1969).
79. Id.
80. 68 Dauph. 26 (Pa. C.P. 1955).

should not be admitted in evidence without calling as witnesses those who prepared the reports.8'
The court's decision in Weaver, phrased in such broad terms, suggests that the court would not admit any report by a Department
investigator unless he were present in court, no matter what the
content of such report.
C.

The SubstantialEvidence Rule

The Department's adjudications must be supported by "substantial evidence. 81 2 The failure to fulfill this requirement has
often been the basis for reversal of the Department's adjudications
by the commonwealth court. In Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth,8 3 the court stated that "'substantial evidence' is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, and more is required than a mere scintilla of
8' 4
evidence or suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established.
A thorough analysis of the "substantial evidence" requirement is
contained in the court's opinion in A.P. Weaver and Sons v. Sanitary Water Board8 5 wherein Judge Mencer cites a definition formulated by Dean E. Blythe Stason of the University of Michigan
Law School:8 6
[T] he term 'substantial evidence' should be construed to
confer finality upon an administrative decision on the facts
when, upon an examination of the entire record, the evidence, including the inferences therefrom, is found to be
such that a reasonable man, acting reasonably, might have
reached the decision; but, on the other hand, if a reasonable man, acting reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the evidence and its inferences then the decision is not supported
by substantial evidence and it should
7
be set aside.
One problem with the reasonable man standard is that a reviewing
court may unconsciously substitute its own discretion in place of
the agency's discretion. The commonwealth court, quoting Dean
Stason, has recognized the following limits on its use of discretion:88
81. Id. at 27.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962). See note 48 and accompanying test supra.
83. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971). Accord, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Kaufmann Dep't Stores, 345 Pa. 398, 29
A.2d 90 (1942); Pennsylvania State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Schireson, 360 Pa. 120, 61 A.2d 343 (1948); and Eric Resistor Corp. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd., 194 Pa. Super. 278, 166 A.2d 96 (1960).
84. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 456, 279 A.2d at 397.
85. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971).
86. Id. at 505, 284 A.2d at 518.
87. Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA.
L. REV. 1026, 1038 (1941).
88. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 505, 284 A.2d at 518.
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[T] he substantial evidence rule is eminently sound, provided always that it is limited to fact questions and not extended into the domain of legitimate administrative discretion, and provided, further, that the courts in passing upon
what the reasonable man would or would not decide take
due account of the element of technical expertness found
to exist in the administrative arena. 89
D.

Application of the SubstantialEvidence Rule

When the Department revokes or refuses to issue a permit to
discharge polluted water, 90 it must establish by "substantial evidence" that the discharge pollutes the waters of the Commonwealth. Similarly, when an abatement order is issued to an air
polluter, 9 1 it must be established by substantial evidence that the
air is being polluted. The problem then arises of what types of
evidence will be considered "substantial."
The court has held in Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth92 and
North American Coal Corp. v. Commonwealth93 that if scientific
tests could possibly have been used, expert testimony based on
visual observation would not constitute substantial evidence. The
court reasoned that some test instrument should be employed in
fairness to the citizen whose business was in danger of being taken
from him. 94 Where scientific tests are not feasible, the visual tests
must be made "accurately and fairly."9 5 The court based this
holding on the following philosophy:
This Court cannot close its eyes to the necessity of a regulatory agency proving its case. Somehow regulatory agencies such as the Air Pollution Commission and its employees, take the attitude that because they represent the government, there is no need for them to prove facts, except as
established by the estimates and observations of their experts. Merely because the Commonwealth employs experts in the various fields of regulation does not necessarily mean the Commonwealth need not prove its case.
This is no small matter. To permit the Commission to
order an abatement based solely upon the visual test and

observations of one employee strikes at the heart of fair89.

U. PA. L. REV. at 1051.

90.

The Department is given authority to issue and revoke permits

under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.609 (Supp. 1972).

91.

The Department is given authority to issue abatement orders un-

der PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4004(4.1) (Supp. 1972).

92. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
93. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
94. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
95. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.

441,
469,
441,
469,

279 A.2d 388
279 A.2d 356
460, 279 A.2d
477, 279 A.2d

(1971).
(1971).
388, 399 (1971).
356, 391 (1971).

ness envisioned in every judicial process known to our
system of jurisprudence. 96
It is submitted, however, that fairness is not the court's only reason
for prohibiting visual tests, but that credibility is also at issue. The
issue of credibility arose in Judge Kramer's opinion in North
American Coal Corp. v. Commonwealth,9 7 where he states:
We must evaluate the testimony of the Commission's witness in the light that he is an employee of the very same
adjudicating body passing upon his testimony. It doesn't
take unusual wisdom to understand the closeness of the
witness to the adjudicating body and the possibilities that
present themselves to an employee attempting to impress
his employer. 98
In effect, the court is not condemning the visual test used by the
Commission's expert but appears to be questioning his credibility
and the weight of his testimony. In Sanitary Water Board v. Anthony, 99 it was stated:
Since the Board is the ultimate-fact-finding body it is
beyond our province in this appeal to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the testimony. The
Board may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Further, the credibility and weight
of the testimony of one who qualifies as an expert is not
reviewable as a matter of law. 100
When reviewing the Department's determinations, the commonwealth court should neither question the credibility of one who
has qualified as an air pollution expert, nor comment on the weight
of his testimony. The court, however, must determine whether the
adjudication is supported by substantial evidence. If the only evidence in the Department's records is the testimony of one air pollution expert, his testimony will be subject to the requirements of
the substantial evidence rule. The result of this inconsistency, in
effect, permits the court to determine what will constitute acceptable proof in a field which is highly technical and in an appeal
where its use of discretion is limited. In Blumenschein v. Housing
Authority of Pittsburgh,1 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated:
That the court might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the agency is not a sufficient ground for interference; judicial discretion
may not
10 2
be substituted for administrative discretion.
It is submitted that the commonwealth court may have deviated from that mandate. For example, in Bortz Coal Co. v. Com96. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 458, 279 A.2d 388, 398 (1971).
97. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356 (1971).
98. Id. at 476, 279 A.2d at 360.
99. 66 Dauph. 250 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
100. Id. See also, Sullivan v. National Tube Co., 163 Pa. Super. 560,
563, 63 A.2d 111, 112 (1949).
101. 379 Pa.566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954).
102. Id. at 572-73, 109 A.2d 334-35.
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monwealth,103 the court was "puzzled why such an inexpensive
method of testing" as the Ringelmann Smoke Test was not employed by the expert witness. 0 4 The Ringelmann Chart consists of
a plain white piece of paper divided into four sections. Each section contains a series of intersecting black lines which grow progressively wider from section one to section four. The chart is
posted fifty feet from the observer and he compares the color of
the smoke being emitted from the stack to the corresponding color
on the chart.' 05 Under Pennsylvania Air Pollution Commission
Regulation IV, Section 1.3, an air pollution problem exists where
the smoke emitted is darker than the second section of the Ringelmann Chart. Such tests may be "criticized as arbitrary because
they are dependent upon the subjective view of the observer."' 06
The court is concerned about the objectivity of the agency's expert
witness and yet would accept a test which is, of itself, highly subjective. In California, where the Ringelmann Test is employed,
it has been held unnecessary for the expert to actually employ the
Ringelmann Chart on the testing scene. 07 The expert witness in
Bortz testified that the smoke emissions were in excess of those allowed by the regulation which utilized the Ringelmann Chart as a
standard.108 It is submitted that this evidence would be substantial if it were established that the expert performing the test was
qualified and experienced in the use of the Ringelmann Chart.
Whether or not lay testimony will constitute substantial evidence was before the court in North American Coal Corp. v. Commonwealth.10 9 The court held that the testimony of three housewives concerning particulate coal dust matter falling beyond the
appellant's property line "was not sufficient to be characterized as
103. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971).
104. Id. at 459, 279 A.2d at 399.
105. City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 472 P.2d 826 (Ore.
1970).
106. Air Pollution: Causes, Sources and Abatement, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q.
205, 222 (1968).
107. People v. International Steel Corp., 102 Cal. App. 2d 935, 226 P.2d
587 (Super. Ct. 1951):
Defendants complain that these witnesses showed no qualifications
sufficient to enable them to give expert testimony on this subject,
and that their observation was not sufficient because they had no
Ringelmann Charts with them when the observations were made.
. . . The witness just mentioned, attended this school before mak-

ing the observations to which they testified and by that and other
experience acquired the ability to estimate the opacity and color
of smoke such as they testified to with reference to the Ringelmann Chart without actually using the chart.
Id. at 939, 226 P.2d 593.
108. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 457, 379 A.2d 388, 398 (1971).
109. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 464, 479, 279 A.2d 356, 362 (1971).

substantial evidence." 110 This holding serves to illustrate the
court's demand for scientific testing. It is submitted that lay testimony may never be substantial evidence in an air pollution abatement proceeding. The Department's regulations speak in terms of
"ground level concentrations" and other technical terms beyond
the scope of a layman's knowledge.'"
The sources of water pollution may not always be clear. For
example, a stream near a coal mine may be polluted, but this in
itself does not demonstrate that the mine is the cause of the pollution. In A.P. Weaver and Sons v. Sanitary Water Board,1 2 the
commonwealth court held that an inference of causation did not
constitute substantial evidence of causation.' 1 3 In Weaver, the
Sanitary Water Board had revoked the company's permit to discharge acid mine water because a spring in the vicinity of the mine
was becoming polluted. The Board's expert witness based his conclusion on the premise that the geological conditions in the area
indicated that Weaver's mine would drain through the ground into
the spring." 4 No tests were performed to support this conclusion.
Evidence was presented that the main receiving tributary in the
area had "doubled in acidity" since the beginning of the company's
operation, however, no actual causation was shown between this
occurrence and the company's operation." 5 The court, in reversing
the adjudication, suggested that dye tests may have been employed
to discover if the mine was draining into the spring. 11 It is questionable whether the court's decision in Weaver means causation
may never be established by inference since the assumptions made
by the Board's experts do not seem reasonable. Whether a reasonable assumption would constitute substantial evidence of causation is at present left open to question.

IV. THE ABANDONED MINE

CASES

If a mine owner is going to discharge acid mine water from his
mine, he must secure a permit from the Department." 7 The permit will set certain conditions which must be followed if drainage
is to be allowed. One of these conditions is usually that the water
must be treated. The commonwealth court has heard two cases
110. Id.
111. Air Pollution Commission Regulation V, Section 1.3, May 29, 1962,
as amended, June 27, 1967.
112. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971).
113. Id. at 509, 284 A.2d at 520.
114. The Sanitary Water Board's expert witness stated:
Since we at the time the original investigation was made did not
pick up any samples of discharges such as we have now, we have
got to assume that the mining is causing this deterioration because
of the geological conditions ....
Id. at 509 n.5, 284 A.2d at 520.
115. Id. at 509, 284 A.2d at 520.
116. Id.
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.609 (Supp. 1972).
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which raised the novel issue of whether an operating coal mine is
responsible for treating polluted water discharged from an abandoned mine in the vicinity and not created by its own mine.
In Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commonwealth,118 the company
sought a permit to discharge 3.44 million gallons of water per day.
The company proposed only to treat the 1.27 million gallons per
day which originated from its own mine. The other 2.17 million
gallons of discharged water leaked into the coal company's mine
from abandoned mines in the vicinity. The Sanitary Water Board
refused to grant a permit unless the total mine drainage was
treated. In the companion case of Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal
Co.119 the coal company was required by the Department of Mines
in 1958 to pump the waters from an abandoned mine adjacent to
the coal company's mine. The Department of Mines' purpose for
the order was a concern that the hydrostatic pressure against the
barrier between the coal company's mine and the abandoned mine
might give way, thus injuring the miners working in the company's
mine. From 1958 to 1968 the company was allowed by the Department of Health to discharge the waters from the abandoned
mine without treatment. In 1968, the company was required to
submit a new application for a permit. The application was denied
and a hearing before the Sanitary Water Board resulted in an order
for the company to cease operation until a new permit application
was submitted providing for the treatment of the waters discharged from the abandoned mine.
In both cases the court by a 3 to 2 margin, held that the mine
owners were not responsible for the treatment of waters discharged
or resulting from the abandoned mines even though such discharges were necessary to carry on the operation of the owners'
own mines. 120 The court based its decisions on five premises: (1)
That industrial wastes, as defined under the Clean Streams Act of
1965, do not include waters left in an underground pool resulting
from an abandoned mine; 121 (2) that the discharge from abandoned mines is not mine drainage as defined by the act; 22 (3) that
the underground pool of polluted water left in the abandoned
mines constituted waters of the Commonwealth as defined by the
act; 12 3 (4) that the guidelines formulated by the Board on "Inactive
118. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 407, 286 A.2d 459 (1972).
119. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 435, 285 A.2d 898 (1972).
120. Bowman, President Judge, Judges Crumlish and Rogers for the
majority; Judges Mencer and Kramer dissenting.
121. See notes 126-9 and accompanying text infra.
122. See note 132 and accompanying text infra.
123. See notes 133-4 and accompanying text infra.

Workings" mitigate the liability of mine owners for the discharge
of acid mine drainage from underground pools; 1 24 and (5)

that

the Board's interpretation of the Clean Streams Law and its order
constitute an 5unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive exercise of
police power.

1

The term "industrial wastes" is generally defined in the Clean
Streams Law of 1965, which was the law at the time of this case,
as "any liquid . . . resulting from any manufacturing or industry
"126 The court held that since an aban* . . and mine drainage ....

doned mine does not carry out industrial pursuits, a discharge from
this mine does not constitute "industrial waste" and thus is not
violative of the Act. 127 Both cases have been appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Commonwealth's brief requesting reversal of the commonwealth court ruling logically points out
that "the pumping of all the mine drainage from the mine is necessary to, and for the specific purpose of allowing Respondent's industrial pursuit of mining.' 1 28 Judge Mencer
presents the same
29
theory in his dissenting opinion in Harmar.The court has also held in PittsburghCoal that a body of water
naturally polluted by the walls of an abandoned mine does not
constitute mine drainage. "Since the mines which it occupies are
abandoned and no longer exists, can we continue to call this underground water 'mine drainage'? We think not.' 130 The court in
PittsburghCoal further stated:
"Mine drainage," like other "industrial wastes" arises from
the property of the mining applicant as a result of his mining operations. The discharge here involved is not so constituted. We, therefore, hold that the diversion into another water course of the water naturally flowing into the
applicant's mine from the Irwin Basin pool is not a "discharge from the mine" of "drainage and ...

industrial

waste" within the meaning of Section 315 of the Clean
Streams Law.' 3 '
124. See notes 130-140 and accompanying text infra.
125. See notes 144-6 and accompanying text infra.
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971).
127. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
407, 421, 286 A.2d 459, 466-67 (1971).
128. Brief for Appellant at 7, Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water
Bd., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania No.
(Feb. 16, 1972).
129. Sanitary Water Bd. v. Harmar Coal Co., 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
435, 265 A.2d 898, wherein Judge Mencer stated:
Under the facts of this case I do not believe that the discharge
from the Indianola Mine can be separated from the operation of
the Harmar Mine. The sole reason that polluted water is being
pumped from Indianola into the receiving streams is so that the
Harmar Mine can operate. If pumping stopped, so would the
operation of the Harmar Mine, because it would no longer be safe
for miners to go into the Harmar Mine.
Id. at 445, 285 A.2d at 903.
130. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 407, 421-22, 286 A.2d 459, 467 (1972).
131. Id. at 422-23, 286 A.2d at 467.
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The court reasoned that the Clean Streams Law of 1965 defines
underground waters polluted by abandoned mines as being "waters
of the Commonwealth."' 3 2 "Waters of the Commonwealth," as defined in the Clean Streams Law, includes:
Any and all rivers, streams, creeks, rivulets, impoundments, ditches, water courses, storm sewers, lakes, damned
water, ponds, springs and all other bodies or channels of
conveyance of surface and underground water, or parts
thereof, whether natural or artificial,
within or on the
133
boundaries of the Commonwelath.
Relying on this definition, the court concluded that the underground waters in the Pittsburgh Coal case were part of the waters
of the Commonwealth. The court then reasoned that since this underground pool was a water of the Commonwealth, the divergence of
this water of the Commonwealth into another water of the Commonwealth, even though caused by pumping of a deep coal mine,
was not pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth as defined
by the Clean Streams Law. The court noted:
To hold otherwise would mean that whenever two bodies
of water are diverted into a common flow for industrial
or manufacturing purposes, if either or both bodies contained deleterious substances in its natural state, then the
water becomes "pollution" because it must be by definition
render the other body unclean. This was not the intent of
the Clean Streams Law. Under the Clean Streams Law,
unlike the previous laws, pollution occurs when noxious
and deleterious substances are first discharged into any
'waters of the Commonwealth.' The statutory scheme does
not speak to the proliferation
1 4 of pollutants by intermingling Commonwealth water.
It is submitted that the co-mingling of underground polluted
water and surface waters does constitute pollution. The prime purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Clean Streams Law was to
prevent the pollution of the surface waters of the Commonwealth. 1 5 This is indicated by Section 315 of the Clean Streams
Law, which states:
A permit is not to be issued if the Board shall be of the
opinion that the discharge from the mine would be or become inimical or injurious to the public health, animal or
132.

Id. at 422, 286 A.2d at 466.

133.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1972).

134. 4 Pa. Commonwealty Ct. 407, 420, 286 A.2d 459, 466 (1972).
135. Brief for Appellant, Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Bd.,
No. 90 (May term 1972): "The regulation of mining as set forth in . . .the
Clean Streams Law is designed to prevent pollution of the surface stream."

aquatic life or to the use of the water for domestic or industrial consumption or recreation. 3 6
The protected areas, as enumerated, are all connected with surface
water, except for water used for consumption. In the 1965 amendments to the Act, the Legislature specifically stated in its Findings
and Declaration of Policy that "Mine drainage is a major cause of
stream pollution in Pennsylvania and is doing immense damage to
the waters of the Commonwealth."'13 7 The discharge from the operating mine in the Pittsburgh Coal case and from the abandoned
mine in the Harmar Coal case were admitted to contain concentrations of iron and acid above the minimum standards set in the
rules and regulations of the Sanitary Water Board. Thus, it is submitted that the court's decision is diametrically opposed to the
policy enunciated by the Legislature, since its result is to proliferate the pollution of the surface waters of the Commonwealth.
In determining whether the two coal companies were unlawfully denied permits to carry out their mining activities, the court
employed certain guidelines published by the Department of
Health to assist mine owners in completing their applications for
permits. 138 These guidelines were used by the court to establish
that a mine owner need not treat waters which must be drained
from an inactive mine in order for an active mine to be operated,
unless the "Base Waste Load" is increased. 139 The court thus reasons that "the Board only prohibits the drainage of mine water that
would be more polluted than the pool into which it drains."' 40 By
employing these guidelines, the court is in reality holding that an
operating coal mine may discharge polluted waters from an inactive mine as long as the waste being pumped from the mine does
not exceed the amount of "normal waste load" which would emanate from the mine if no pumping were performed. It is submitted
that these guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
may not be employed by the court since they do not have the
status of rules and regulations formulated under the Clean Streams
Law. In order for such guidelines to have any force and effect,
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 315 (Supp. 1972).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.4 (Supp. 1972).
138. Department of Health-"Guidelines Regarding Mining in Areas
Affected by Inactive Working" § IV-A-4:
4. Mining requiring the pumping or draining of adjacent inactive
mines to protect the active workings. The operator(s) will be
required to meet Board requirements for drainage from his active
mine as well as the pollutional increment in excess of the estimated Base Waste Load. . . resulting from changes in the drainage
pattern in the inactive mine. The maximum limitation would be
the *Base Waste Load or the standards set by the Board, whichever
is higher (footnote omitted).
139. Id.:
*Base Waste Load is the normal waste load originating without
pumping or change in drainage pattern from one or more inactive
mines as determined by the Board.
140. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Bd., 4 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 407, 420 n.8, 286 A.2d 459 at 466 n.8 (1972).
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they must be approved by the Department of Justice. 141 The commonwealth court by employing these guidelines, in effect, is creating new law, and only an administrative agency may formulate
rules and regulations to implement the law as prescribed by the
Legislature. 142 Basically these guidelines can be considered little
14
more than "statements of policy.'

3

The Pittsburgh Coal case is significant because of the court's
holding that the Board's order would be unconstitutional. It is admitted by the court that the "statutory provisions cited by the
Board in its adjudication are capable of interpretation as presented
by the Board."' 144 The court, however, states that where two interpretations of a statute are possible, one being constitutional and
the other being unconstitutional, the constitutional interpretation
must be applied 145 since "the Legislature does not intend to violate
the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth."'1 46
The court held that the Board's interpretation was unconstitutional, stating:
The application of the Board's interpretation of the
statutory law to appellant, to the extent that it denies to
appellant the use and enjoyment of its property unless it
assumed responsibility for the treatment of fugitive water
entering its mine through no fault of appellant, constitutes
an unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive exercise of the
police power. The Board would hold that the Legislature,
in exercise of its police power, not only imposed new and
stringent conditions upon appellant's use and enjoyment of
its property but would also charge appellant with responsibility for fugitive water under penalty of denying 14appellant any use and enjoyment of its property as a mine. 7
In another environmental case, Bortz Coal Company v. Commonwealth,148 the court was also presented with the issue of unreasonable exercise of police power. In that case, however, it was
stated by the court that a citizen's property rights are subordinate
to the right of reasonable regulation necessary "to preserve the
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.21 (1962).
142. See, Volunteer Firemen's Relief Association of City of Reading v.
Minehart, 425 Pa. 82, 227 A.2d 632 (1967).

143. Sanitary Water Bd. v. Harmar Coal Co., 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
435, 447, 285 A.2d 898, 904 (dissent) (1972).
144. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 407, 423, 286 A.2d 459, 468 (1972).
145. Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Evans
v. West Norriton Twp., 370 Pa. 150, 87 A.2d 474 (1952); Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Hines, 337 Pa. 48, 10 A.2d 553 (1940).
146.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 552 (1964).

147.
148.

4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 407, 423, 286 A.2d 459, 467 (1972).
2 Pa.. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971).

health, safety and morals of the people." 149 Obviously, the result
of allowing the coal companies in Pittsburg Coal and Harmer Coal
to discharge untreated polluted mine waters is adverse to the public welfare if the surface waters of the Commonwealth are being
polluted. Although a business may not be the cause of a condition,
it can be required to remedy the condition if the operation of its
business would be unlawful. 150 Furthermore, in these cases the
polluted waters of the abandoned mines would not have been discharged into the surface waters of the Commonwealth but for the
operations of the mines. It does not seem unreasonable to ask the
mine operators to bear the expense of all waters they discharge.
In order for the exercise of the police power to be valid, it must
be justified by the "interest of the public."'' 1 The public interest
is exemplified in both the Clean Stream Law' 52 and article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 53 Both recognize the
importance of clean waters to the citizens of the Commonwealth.
CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, prior to its decision
in Harmar and Pittsburgh Coal, has been primarily concerned with
defining acceptable practices and procedures in cases involving environmental issues. These actions by the court, though questionable in certain areas, serve to establish the ground rules which environmentalist and the Department of Environmental Resources
must follow when seeking to regulate potential polluters or seeking
legal relief against actual polluters.
It is submitted that the court's decisions in Commonwealth v.
Harmar Coal Co.'5 4 and Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commonwealth"5
will have an adverse effect on the environment of the Commonwealth. Any deep coal mine operator, presently operating his
mine in proximity to abandoned mines, will now be entitled to
treat less of his discharge since, in all probability, some of this discharge results from waters left in inactive mines. Furthermore,
in the past, a mine may have been abandoned because it was uneconomical to drain adjacent mines. Now these mines may be reopened without being required to treat the waters discharged from
adjacent abandoned mines. It is hoped, however, that the court
will re-examine the rationale of these 'decisions in light of the
strong public policy in favor of a clean environment in Pennsylvania.
Momis L. STOLTZ II
149. Id. at 451, 279 A.2d at 392.
150. Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc. v. Sael, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
151. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1854).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-691.901 (Supp. 1972).
153. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1968).
154. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 407, 286 A.2d 459 (1972).
155. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 435, 285 A.2d 898 (1972).

